Hey does anybody know the current composition of a re-equipped (i.e. M16s Humvees etc) ANA Infantry Battalion in 2010? Are helicopters and heavier vehicle assests like M113s organic or attached as required? I have about 25 of the Irregular US Infantry in 15mm but the equipment they are carrying is too old for current Marines, and three Mi-24s. I'm thinking they might serve as re-equipped ANA?

Cheers for any help.

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The Changer of Minds

Currently, an ANA battalion is as follows:

HHC Company

4x Infantry Companies (Organization is roughly the same as the US Army: Plt HQ + 3x Rifle platoons (9men each) + 1x Wpns Squad)


1x Hvy Wpns Company w/81mm Mortars and SPG-9 recoiless rifles and Battalion Scout Platoon

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Sine Pari

Are they using PKM in the infantry squads or just the weapons squad? I see allot of PKM's in photos, so not sure what level they are incorporated in.

regards
Mathew

It will vary. The ANA's equipment complement will not be uniform, but the primary difference between machine guns in the rifle squads and the weapons squad will be that the weapons squad will have tripods.

The ultimate end-state goal is to equip the ANA rifle squad the same as a US Army rifle squad with M16s, M16/M203s, and M249 SAWs with the Weapons Platoon mimicking each other.

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Sine Pari

The biggest problem with the ANA is the officer and NCO corps. Most are willing, but the country's incredibly high illiteracy rate and lack of direction (mentor teams are understaffed) makes it difficult to instruct and correct doctrine.

Additionally, our societies have had centuries to perfect our warrior arts; they (the ANA) have had what? 7 years?

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Sine Pari

I dunno... Some would argue that the Afghans have had several hundred years to perfect their form of warfare.

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http://www.guildwargamers.com

Definately don't think it is a lack of inherent combat ability in the Afghan soldier that is the issue. Troops joining for some free cash and pissing off at the first sign of trouble, poor command and control, and the fact they are trying to make the Afghans into a facsimile of US forces is the issue IMO. They are wasting a valuable resource which could, in my opinion, potentially be used to fight fire with fire. And where they do insist on using Afghan troops in a conventional sense, they should be interspersed equally and permanently with NATO troops, both to stiffen up their fighting ability and help with further training, and to make sure the Afghans actually see their own government contributing to their safety, rather than these "Afghan face" operations where the ANA are essentially told to stand around so everything is diplomatically hunky dory and then bugger off to their home province straight after.

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The Changer of Minds

That's okay, the argument that I made was originally given to me by an ANA Captain/ At any rate, it is countered by reminding those that Afghans are alright at fighting other Afghans, but awful at fighting outsiders, despite what popular revisionist history would have you believe.



I am incredibly hard on the ANA, but this is a completely inaccurate picture of what they do. I will say, though, that the Afghan fighter is the most overhyped and underperforming warrior of the 20th and 21st centuries.

Let controversy ensue.

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Sine Pari

I would suggest two different styles are being discussed and mixed.

As a traditional tribal fighter, the Afghan probably does what is required of him and individually within that tribal environment is ok.

As part of a western style military organisation that places no importance on tribal, family, religious affiliations, he see nothing or very little in it for him and probably has allot of trouble understanding the concepts. This then reflects in his combat ability.

An example from my part of the world would be Papua New Guinea Military. Individually and within their tribal environment they can be quite warlike and have those warrior traits, but as part of a western style military defence force they are generally ill disciplined and mediocre at best.

While we see the way we do business and organise as logical, many of the concepts are totally alien to these people. They just don't think like us. That is not derogatory, it is just different. In that sense they could be from Mars let alone from Earth.

Just my 2c worth.

On the contrary, they do very well when integrated. The Commando kandaks, in particular, are very highly regarded with ISAF and the locals. The regular Infantry kandaks that are forward deployed are also regarded very well. The ANA's poor reputation stems from some of their more static formations, and some early poor performances; it happens. Most Afghans WANT to be united under Afghanistan. The ethnic and sectarian divisions didn't exist 40 years ago, it is a very new phenomena in the country that has been exacerbated by the destruction of the nation's education system and exploited by the warlords, Pakistani ISI, the Taliban, and the Mujahideen.

The ANA has come a long way for an organization that is less than a decade old.

The Afghan (raid)fighter has alot of PR on his side when it is completely unwarranted. This is the fault of mainstream popular history. I love Afghanistan with all of my heart and I love the Afghans, but the myth that people have surrounded them with is unwarranted and not realistic. If anything, I think more like them than "us". I was an unconventional warfighter in the mountains chasing Taliban, and "others" up and down the NWFP border. Raid has a time and place and it is filled by the Commandos and the ANBP. The regular ANA need to be shock heavy infantry, and that's what they are becoming. And they (the forward deployed units) are starting to get very good at it .

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Sine Pari

Good points and key word there, integration. I know performances increase in my neck of the woods when this happens.

Being tasked appropriately is also a big thing.

The exploitation of the tribal system and the other factors as you mentioned has certainly bought things undone. As you say, it has only been a few years and these sorts of systems and changes do not happen overnight.

Sorry guys if my view was harsh or inaccurate. My only understandings come from what I have read and the experiences related to me by a couple of family friends who have served as contractors in the Ghan. Admittedly none of those sources are especially fond of the ANA, and most are dated around 2007. Care to share a more accurate view for me of current day-today ANA ops?

Cheers

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The Changer of Minds

Really?

They existed in the 19th century. Tribal secularism has always been important in the region, to the point of almost constant warfare for several hundred years. Afghanistan went through an unending series of civil wars, only stopping when someone invaded!

But that may not be the point that you are making.

My knowledge of the Afghan fighter is more from the 19th century than recent periods. I do wonder if the result of teh Soviet-Afghan War was due more to the Soviet inability to absorb the lessons of anti-insurgency warfare and the lack of initiative to destroy it, coupled with a very unpopular puppet Afghan regime, rather than any military expertise on the part of the Mujehedin, though there are a couple of commanders whose ability I would rate, both long since passed away by now however.

Having been reading up on the Second Afghan War lately, your comments on the Afghan fighter are remarkably similar to those of several British officers who served in the theatre. Basically that the average tribal warrior has some ability at raids and ambushes, lacks inherent military training and ability and is incapable of performing standard military operations unless heavily led by regulars.

The British comments during 1879 on the Afghan Regular Army were deservedly damning and its performance was on the whole pretty dreadful. Despite this though, the British disaster at Maiwand was due to the combination of Afghan regular artillery and tribal mass wave attacks. Once more British complacency led to disaster. I guess I always feel that the Afghans are not a people to be underestimated, though perhaps recent history (1880 - 1990) has tended since Maiwand and the fighting on the North-West Frontier since 1880 to glorify and celebrate the regions hill fighters. I think this is in no small part due to the Victorian propaganda machine that liked to portray those enemies to which it suffered losses, as dangerous and competent opponents, rather than admit that British complancy and lack of duty, were the general causes of British defeats...

Interesting discussion though gents, and Nox, interesting to have a current military perception to compare to those of 1880! I suspect you would have had much in common with the British Officers who led their Indian troops into action along the border. I wish I could offer a more substantial contribution to the discussion of the present Afghan military, but my interest has always been centred on the 19th century.

Though I suspect, some of the guns fired at the British in the 19th century are still being fired at us now...

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http://www.guildwargamers.com

The problem is age old . The ANA is largely Tajik ( over 60 % ) and their opposition is mainly Pashtun . Pretty much a post Soviet withdrawl situation and reverting to the post 2003 Northern Alliance Balance of Power .

http://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/ ... certa.html

As is seen the country is not heading for stability under this increasingly bi polar state .

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'' I love my models , they are made of swiss cheese ''

Absolutely the vast majority want to be united, to include Pashtun. They just have some concerns and everyone knows Karzai is not the man to do it. Shah Massoud maybe, but he came with his own set of problems. After 30 years of war; they're ready and they need it. -edit- Maybe "vast majority" is the wrong phrasing, but I would say an overall majority wants unification. There will always be people who don't want it, but then, there are people who think the South should secede from the Union again

I have to be careful with what I say. I don't want to take away from the Afghans because what they do is alright and has worked for them, sorta, for awhile but they need to absorb that heavy infantry capability; especially if they're going to have static garrison type kandaks. And they do need time and outside help to develop their NCO and officer corps. I know a few guys who are doing mentoring work, and one of them is complete garbage and totally does not understand the magnitude of what he is doing; he doesn't understand that he has the most important job in the country and that he is shaping the future of Afghanistan. To say I am disappointed by my Big Army brethren would be an understatement.

American, like British, complacency is causing alot of problems. It would take forever to describe the monumental mistakes that we have made, and continue to make, that have literally snatched defeat from the jaws of victory because we were busy with that "other" war. I suspect the same thing will happen here, either that or we'll go the other way and simply redefine victory and arbitrarily declare we have achieved it. :\

I see some parallels between Soviet-Afghan and OEF, notably in the haphazard way troops are being utilized ("Force Protection" for example, is not a mission or reason for being in-country, it's just something you do), and the pressure coming from career politicians and the public. Gorbachev, in 1985, came to power and made similar demands of the Red Army that Obama has made: "Find a solution in 1 year". To appease the public, he drew down conventional forces while secretly increasing the number of spetznaz in-country and operations ramped up for awhile. And when the Muj were on the ropes, Gorby drew back. Same shit.

I need to look more into the Great Game; I am only aware of the basics. All of my Afghan time has been on the here and now, Alexander, and the middle ages.

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Sine Pari